This article jointly examines the differences of laboratory versions of the Dutch clock open auction, a sealed-bid auction to represent book building, and a two-stage sealed bid auction to proxy for the "competitive IPO", a recent innovation used in a few European equity initial public offerings. We investigate pricing, seller allocation, and buyer welfare allocation efficiency and conclude that the book building emulation seems to be as price efficient as the Dutch auction, even after investor learning, whereas the competitive IPO is not price efficient, regardless of learning. The competitive IPO is the most seller allocative efficient method because it maximizes offer proceeds. The Dutch auction emerges as the most buyer welfare allocative efficient method. Underwriters are probably seeking pricing efficiency rather than seller or buyer welfare allocative efficiency and their discretionary pricing and allocation must be important since book building is prominent worldwide.
Este artigo examina conjuntamente as diferenças de versões experimentais do leilão holandês, um leilão de lances fechados representando o book building, e um leilão similar de dois estágios encarnando o "IPO competitivo", uma inovação usada em algumas ofertas públicas iniciais de ações (IPOs) europeias. Investigamos a eficiência no apreçamento e na alocação e concluímos que o book building simulado é tão eficiente no apreçamento quanto o leilão holandês enquanto o IPO competitivo não é eficiente no apreçamento, independentemente do aprendizado do investidor. O IPO competitivo é o método mais eficiente na alocação ao emissor porque maximiza a captação. O leilão holandês emerge como o método mais eficiente para a alocação ao comprador. Os intermediários financeiros devem preferir a eficiência no apreçamento em vez de eficiência na alocação e sua discricionariedade nestes procedimentos deve ser importante porque o book building é proeminente no mundo.
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RESUMEN
El presente artículo examina de forma conjunta las diferencias entre las versiones de laboratorio de la subasta holandesa, una subasta de oferta cerrada para presentar las ofertas, y una subasta cerrada de dos fases para actuar como apoderados de la " IPO competitiva", una 
INTRODUCTION
Setting the price is one of the key issues in an initial equity public offering (IPO) because there is no price history and often no clear price reference. Financial institutions around the world carry out the pricing process of IPOs in a competitive underwriting market and keep the information about the intensions of their customers private. Thus, it is very difficult to conduct natural experimental studies with real data unless local laws mandate its disclosure. Non-replicable case studies that use private and non-identified data may constitute an alternative. However, if there is no access to the actual pricing data, controlled experiments of a stock-offering environment are a surrogate to investigate the implications of different pricing methods, return levels and the unveiling of information.
Book building and the Dutch auction are the most discussed IPO bidding methods in the literature (Jenkinson & Ljunqvist, 2001, pp. 39-40; Sherman, 2005, p. 615) . The competitive IPO is a relatively new method. It consists of a two-stage process that separates the decision to hire an advising bank to structure the offer from a competitive bid to appoint another bank to sell the offer. The competitive IPO aims to avoid the bait-and-switch problem in which an underwriter may pressure for a lower offer price after hired by the issuers. It intends to reduce pricing inefficiency when created and used for the first time (Jenkinson & Jones, 2009) The analysis of pricing efficiency of these methods is another contribution. We define pricing efficiency in the IPO context as initial returns close to zero. Lowry and Schwert (2004) used the ex-post observed underpricing and midpoint of the preliminary price range update to measure IPO pricing efficiency, in the absence of actual bidding data. We analyze the implications for information aggregation of the three price methods with experimental bid data, instead.
A third contribution is to investigate efficiency from the point of view of buyer and seller allocations. The experimental design of the three methods allows joint comparisons, revealing which one of the three methods leads to maximization of proceeds to the seller (seller allocation efficiency) or to the greatest gains to buyers (buyer welfare allocation efficiency) and is supplemental to the Bonini and Voloshyna (2013) study.
We can observe the effects of learning in the joint experimental setting and infer its information aggregation effects on bidding behavior. Thus, we can compare outcomes in earlier and later rounds of the experiments and contrast them with those in Bonini and Voloshyna (2013) . These authors used solely students as subjects. Our last contribution is to include financial market professionals, in addition to students, to account for differences related to business expertise.
Our results are consistent with the preference given to book building by underwriters in the real world. We conclude that book building is as price-efficient as the Dutch auction and both are more price-efficient than the competitive IPO. Price efficiency is greater after subjects become experienced. This is consistent with repeated underwriter consultation with a select group of investors in successive book buildings. The Dutch auction provided greater buyer welfare allocation efficiency.
The competitive IPO showed greater seller allocation efficiency. Our experimental design also exposed the practice of "baitand-switch" in the two-stage competitive IPO, which may be disguised in the one-stage book building.
The results have practical implications because they support book building, which is at least as price efficient as the Dutch auction. Moreover, institutional investors are the main buyers of IPOs in most markets and, supposedly, value frequent contacts with underwriters. Naturally, buyer welfare may influence policy makers to favor the Dutch auction but it leads to weaker relationships among the major participants in the process. Book building overtook auctions around the world, suggesting that policy makers recognized its pricing and allocation qualities, even though there may be a potential cost to issuers (Sherman, 2005) . The competitive IPO did not solve the bait-and-switch problem and its greater complexity led to pricing inefficiency. Policy makers would need to be more innovative to devise another method to replace book building advantageously.
The next section offers a brief review of the literature, followed by the presentation of our experimental design in Section 3. Section 4 offers descriptive statistics and discusses the results for pricing and allocation efficiency for the three emulated methods with investor learning. Section 5 concludes. Smith (1976) Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) and Sherman (2005) emphasize that a key feature of book building is the ability of underwriters to reward investors who reveal their opinion about the true value of the company. Investors that include more information in their bid, such as quantity and price, receive greater allocations and, in turn, help the underwriter set the offer price and allocate shares among investors. Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) sustain that book building is the best pricing method for IPOs because it is a more effective information discovery procedure.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Underwriters cannot exercise price and allocation discretion with auctions. In contrast to book building, investors do not have incentives to provide them with private information to secure favorable allocation. Underwriters would simply aggregate public information. Sherman (2005) and Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001, p. 93) point out that the increasing preference for book building in many markets suggests that there are advantages in the exercise of underwriter discretion in repeated interactions with investors, whereas auctions are a stand-alone event. Trauten and Langer (2012) employ experiments and sustain that there is room for underwriter discretion in the allocation of IPO shares. They conclude that high information acquisition costs might preclude investors from producing information in auctions, while underwriters may adjust the offer price to compensate for information costs in book building. (2009) In Brazil, Leal and Bocater (1992) We close this section with our definitions of efficiency.
Jenkinson and Jones
We refer to efficiency in three different ways: pricing, seller al-location, and buyer welfare allocation efficiency. Pricing efficiency is understood as accurate pricing, as expected when the competitive IPO was used for the first time (Jenkinson & Jones, 2009 ). Seller allocation efficiency is the maximization of the proceeds to the issuer, in the sense employed by Spatt and Srivastava (1991) . Krishna (2002) we computed buyer welfare efficiency as the average of the positive ratios between the sum of the value generated to each investor in each round, considering their actual allocations and prices, and the maximum value that could be generated with those allocations among the investors that would benefit the most from them, considering their individual evaluations. We present an expression for our measure of buyer welfare allocation efficiency in the results section but it is necessary to introduce our experiment design first, as presented in the next section.
EXPERIMENT DESIGN
Three variations of auctions reproduce, in the laboratory, selected key aspects of pricing under book building and the competitive IPO, such as each investor considering private information in recurrent interactions with a non-discretionary underwriter to inform quantity and price. This set-up is common in the literature and renders the experiment viable, but it distances our pricing mechanism from real book building because it does not include aspects such as the preferential or discriminatory allocation by underwriters, as well as their repeated interaction with their clients (Bonini & Voloshyna) .
The uniform Dutch Clock descending-price open auction, henceforward called Dutch auction, is our auction pricing method. We use a sealed-bid uniform price auction, which is a variation of the Dutch auction used in IPOs, to approximate for book building, and a two-stage version of this sealed-bid uniform price auction to emulate the competitive IPO. The three methods will be called Dutch auction, "book building", and "competitive IPO" from now on, using the quote marks to denote the instances when it is important to highlight that we are specifically talking about our experiments. We only considered the average initial returns to investigate pricing efficiency and not price dispersion because actual book building is executed over a much longer period than the Dutch auction and we cannot capture this time difference in our experimental environment.
We compared the Dutch auction, "book building" and the "competitive IPO" in the same environment and with parameters from a single structure, enabling us to analyze them jointly. All experimental sessions were designed and conducted with the Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments (Fischbacher, 2007) . A series of pilot tests and sessions precede the experiment sessions that produced our data.
Three rounds of trial IPOs that allowed participants to practice the rules of the experiment preceded the beginning of each session. Data from these trial rounds were excluded from the analysis but their outcomes are qualitatively similar to those from the first twelve-rounds. Each session comprised of twenty-four rounds. Each round represents an IPO. We present our results for all rounds and the last twelve rounds only to appraise potential participant learning.
Participants in the experiment were selected from undergraduate and graduate business students and among employees of a large financial conglomerate, which also acts as an IPO underwriter. All subjects had previous exposure to financial concepts. Table 1 presents details about the participants.
There was a total of nine sessions in the whole experiment, each comprising twenty-four rounds (IPOs), and thus we collected experimental data for 216 (nine times twenty-four) IPOs, seventy-two (three sessions) for each of the pricing methods (Dutch auction, "book building" and "competitive IPO").
Each session lasted sixty to eighty minutes. Eighty-seven different subjects participated in the experiment and each one participated in only one session, regardless of the pricing method employed. There were five sessions with professionals and four with students. There were sessions with professionals and with students for each pricing method.
Fifty-six percent of the participants were professionals and only sixteen percent were women. The experience of professionals in years was three times longer than that of students and, on average, professionals were ten years older than students. Eighty-four percent declared some previous exposure to the stock market. We tested if the performance of professionals and students was different for each pricing method and found no statistically significant results. Two Initial return -Dutch auction -0.64% 1.00% 0.46%
Initial return -"book building" 0.61% 2.77% 1.33%
Initial return -"competitive IPO" -5.21% -6.41% -6.01%
Overall initial return -1.61% -1.16% -1.41%
Note: "Book building" refers to a sealed bid, uniform price auction, and "competitive IPO" to a two-stage version of it. We tested if the performance of professionals and students was different for each pricing method and found no statistically significant results. Two sample t-tests (bank professionals and students) on Dutch auction, "book building" and "competitive IPO" returns reported the following t-statistics (p-values), respectively: 0.838 (0.41), 1.079 (0.28) and -0.546 (0.59).
We follow the informational structure of Kagel and Levin (1986, 1999) . Assume that shares have a true value V, which is the closing market price on the first trading day and a random We did not expect any interaction between subjects in the Dutch auction and "book building" rounds and, in fact, they were not allowed to communicate during the experiment.
We expect some sort of collusive behavior between subjects assigned to the same group in the "competitive IPO". Participants are divided into groups of investors in this case because it is important to isolate clients from the same bank in this procedure. However, participants do not know who the other members of their group are and they are not allowed to communicate. Although there is evidence reporting little bonding between subjects in auction experiments, as noticed by Sherstyuk (1999 Sherstyuk ( , 2002 , these results usually apply to double oral auctions. We offer more details about our "competitive IPO" experiment below.
All participants received a financial reward as an incentive. Each subject received at least the equivalent to five US dollars, enough to recruit participants, and each could earn, depending on performance, as much as $25. We follow Smith 
Dutch auction design
Participants inform the quantity of shares they want to buy considering the prices suggested by the virtual auctioneer, which falls in time during the round in proportion to the actual price level V. This procedure is necessary to prevent small decreases in price level, which could lead to very time-consuming rounds.
"Book building" design
Investors may inform the quantity of shares they are willing to buy and the maximum unit price they are willing to pay for them in each offer (round). The book is built and the clearing price for all allocated investors is the lowest bid informed at the time a bid clears the thirty stocks in the offer. The allocation is made among those that bid at or above the clearing price in proportion to the quantities requested. As in the Dutch auction, participants know their individualized private signal (S i ) and the public price range. They are not aware of the bids and allocations of other participants, but are aware of their own allocation and gains or losses from previous rounds. In "book building", all investors belong to the same group, which means all investors are clients of one bank, contrasting to the "competitive IPO", described in the following section.
"Competitive IPO" design
Price formation here is similar to that in "book building". The difference is the insertion of a preliminary step before the submission and processing of bids. Investors are divided into groups of three participants each. Each group represents the set of customers of one bank. Groups are formed randomly at the beginning of the session and remain the same throughout the twenty-four rounds (IPOs) in the session. Participants do not know who their fellow group members are and cannot communicate among themselves, whether or not they belong to the same group. Table 2 shows that initial returns are not significantly different from zero for the Dutch auction and "book building" and are significantly negative (overpricing) for the "competitive IPO" for all rounds and the last twelve rounds. The proxy for price efficiency is the average initial return that is closest to zero. Thus, our initial results indicate that the Dutch auction and book building are equally price efficient while competitive IPO is significantly less efficient.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Price dispersion was larger in the "competitive IPO", considering all rounds, and in the Dutch auction, for the last twelve rounds. "Book building" also presented maximum initial return in a single offering while the overall minimum occurred under the "competitive IPO". The Dutch auction had the highest minimum initial return. However, a variance ratio test, not reported, between the highest standard deviation for the competitive IPO and the Dutch auction for all rounds is not statistically significant, suggesting that price dispersion does not differ among methods.
We also performed a Jarque-Bera normality test on the distribution of initial returns for all sessions and cannot reject it for the Dutch auction and book building (p-values of 0.23 and 0.59, respectively). Thus initial return dispersion falls within normality for these two methods. Yet, normality was rejected for the competitive IPO at the 1% level. We observed that participants had more difficulty to develop a winning strategy with this method. Table 3 portrays mean difference statistics. There is no significant difference between the initial returns in the Dutch auction and "book building". Initial returns are significantly larger with both "book building" and the Dutch auction relative to the "competitive IPO". The "competitive IPO" led to a much larger number of negative initial returns than the other two pricing methods. Investors perform much worse when the "competitive IPO" is employed. This is consistent with the Bonini and Voloshyna (2013) conclusion of greater investor information revelation in the competitive IPO. After some practice, it seems that investors fared better with the Dutch auction. Although the "competitive IPO" aimed to reduce pricing uncertainty, the greater incidence of negative returns in this method in our experiment does not suggest it will reach this goal. Finally, it seems that participant learning did not affect results because there were no significant differences between all rounds and the last 12 rounds. Even though the results above suggest that the Dutch auction and book building are equally price efficient, Sherman (2005) and Wilhelm (2005) argue that underwriter discretion is important, particularly when information acquisition costs are high, explaining the worldwide dominance of book building. Note: "Book building" refers to a sealed bid, uniform price auction, and "competitive IPO" to a two-stage version of it. t-statistics for two-sided mean (equal to zero) for 72 observations (24 rounds times 3 sessions per method) for all rounds and 36 observations for the last 12 rounds. Wilcoxon z-tests p-values for the median in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 1%. Note: "Book building" refers to a sealed bid, uniform price auction, and "competitive IPO" to a two-stage version of it; significance at 10% and 5% denoted by * and **, respectively. Table 4 presents the differences between the bids and the private signals (S i ) received by each investor in the "book building" and "competitive IPO" sessions. The results indicate that the "competitive IPO" is more likely to result in bids greater than the price signaled as private information. Table 5 shows the final price relative to the midpoint of the preliminary price range. The largest adjustment took place with the Dutch auction, the only method showing a positive adjustment significantly larger than the other two methods in the last twelve rounds. The average price adjustment was significantly negative in the "competitive IPO" relative to the other two pricing methods. This evidence is once more consistent with Bonini and Voloshyna (2013) . Note: "Book building" refers to a sealed bid, uniform price auction, and "competitive IPO" to a two-stage version of it; significance at 10% and 5% denoted by * and **, respectively.
Subjects clearly employed the bait-and-switch strategy in the "competitive IPO", in line with the intuition pre- Note: "Book building" refers to a sealed bid, uniform price auction, and "competitive IPO" to a two-stage version of it; significance at 10% and 5% denoted by * and **, respectively.
"Book building" was the only method in which returns declined after the subjects learned about the process and had time to develop strategies, although they were not significantly different from zero in Table 2 . Subjects gradually posted higher price bids after unsuccessful allocations in the initial rounds.
Greater price bids lead to lower initial returns to investors. In the Dutch auction, on the other hand, returns to investors increased, suggesting lower price bids. Kagel and Levin (1986) documented that agents learn to avoid overpaying for an asset in an auction, the winner's curse, by participating in subsequent auctions, which is consistent with our evidence.
The proxy for seller allocation efficiency was the lowest average initial return, which maximizes proceeds to the seller.
The "competitive IPO" emerged as the most seller allocation efficient method in Table 5 . However, as discussed before, underwriters probably strive for pricing efficiency rather than seller allocation efficiency and, in actuality, should prefer book building, given that most investors are experienced in the IPO market and would like to use their discretion in pricing and allocation.
It is also noteworthy that if sellers are planning to return to the market in the near future, the competitive IPO may not leave, on average, a good taste in the investor's mouth, in contrast with what its proponents desired (Jenkinson & Jones, 2009 ). Note: "Book building" refers to a sealed bid, uniform price auction, and "competitive IPO" to a two-stage version of it. Significance at 10% and 5% denoted by * and **,
, where kqi is the allocation of each participating investor i in the round, V is the true value of the offer, and Si is the private signal or assessment of each investor. The offer size is 30 shares and the maximum allocation per investor in each round is 10 shares. In the denominator, j stands for the three investors with the lowest Si, those that would benefit the most from the maximum allocation of 10 shares.
CONCLUSIONS
We used a descending-price clock auction to emulate a Dutch auction, a one-stage sealed-bid auction to emulate book building, and a two-stage sealed bid auction to emulate the competitive IPO in our experiments. We conclude that book building may be the IPO pricing method that benefits bidding investors the most, at the expense of the issuing firm and selling shareholders, provided that our emulated "book building" is seen as a reasonable approximation of the actual process for the key variables we examined.
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Book building is the most widely adopted IPO pricing method around the world and, thus, our results suggest that underwriters seek pricing efficiency, if our proxies for this concept are good. This evidence is consistent with Trauten and Langer (2012) as well. Our results also suggest that "book building" could be better than the Dutch auction after some learning, but we did not obtain significance for this difference, consistently with Zhang (2009) The "competitive IPO" was the least price efficient method, with or without learning, which somewhat goes against the motivation for its conception in the real world and this evidence contradicts Bonini and Voloshyna (2013) who believe there is room for hybrid methods to price IPOs. We also found evidence the bait-and-switch strategy in the "competitive IPO", suggesting it is important to create rules to discourage this practice wherever the technique is deployed. Although bait-and-switch may be better disguised in the context of book building, our competitive IPO experiment clearly exposed the problem since the competition for mandates is an explicit part of the offering procedure.
The evidence in this article derives from a setting in which bidders are informed and few have attained their optimal bid. Thus, it is not likely that they would do so in the more complex actual IPO auctions. One can also argue that experiments do not lead to realistic conclusions and are vulnerable in terms of the principle of parallelism, and thus, the extensibility of results. However, this kind of debate is mere speculation without actual data available for inspection or analysis to support the difference between laboratory data and real world data (Smith, 1980 (Smith, , 1982 .
Future research could address issues of investor experience in its design and possibly run each session twice, with participants returning at another date. The "book building" design could be modified to consider underwriter discretion to favor allocations to its clients. Another possible extension is to allow communication between subjects and, thus, potential explicit collusion as opposed to the tacit collusion that may have been present in our competitive IPO experiment. Finally, a sensitivity analysis of key parameters could be carried out with alternate sessions.
